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Introduction

Free trade agreements allow participating countries to benefit as trade partners
with remaining parties to the agreement.' Specifically, free trade agreements include provisions that reduce tariffs for exports. 2 United States trade policy encompasses strong attempts to expand their export markets and decrease the
foreign trade barriers placed on U.S. goods and services. 3 Additionally, the
United States is in a unique position to impact the international community
through its relationship with trade partners.4 The U.S. impacted labor standards
in the international community through provisions in all free trade agreements
entered into after 1994, starting with the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"). 5
*
J.D. Candidate, Loyola Chicago School of Law, expected May 2015; B.A., Political Science,
Boston University, 2006.
1 Kevin J. Fandl, Bilateral Agreements and Fair Trade Practices:A Policy Analysis of the Colombia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 10 YAi-u Hum. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 64, 67 (2007).
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Myline Kherallah & John Beghin, U.S. Trade Threats: Rhetoric or War?, 80 AM. J.
AGRIC. EcON. 15 (1998) (examining increased American attempts to expand the export market).
4 Jennifer Alewelt, The Heat Is on in Latin America: The Future and Implications of the Colombian
Free Trade Agreement, 39 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 159, at 162 (2008).
5 Eli J. Kirschner, Fast Track Authority and Its Implication for Labor Protection in Free Trade
Agreements, 44 CORNEuL INr'L L.J. 385, 396 (2011).
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The Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement ("CTPA") entered into force on
May 15, 2012.6 Congress passed the CTPA on October 12, 2011 and President
Obama signed it into law on October 21, 2011.7 Under the CTPA, over 80% of
American exports of goods to Colombia became duty-free upon passage, while
the tariffs on the remaining goods phased out over the next ten years.8 The tariff
reductions under the CTPA will expand U.S. exports to Colombia by over $1.1
billion. 9 Moreover, while the Colombian economy is the third largest in Central
and South America,' 0 it also presents the worst human rights and humanitarian
crisis in the area." Likewise, while the trade agreement increased exports between the countries, it also allowed the U.S. to protect laborers in Colombia
through provisions in the CTPA.1 2 However, the primary criticism of labor provisions and standards in U.S. free trade agreements is the lack of an adequate
mechanism of enforcement.' 3
Part II of this Article provides insight into the violent history of Colombia and
the previous failed free trade agreement with the United States. Colombia has a
long and deadly history between labor unionists, the government and the
paramilitary. Due to this history, as well as continued problems with labor unions, Congress declined to ratify the free trade agreement with Colombia signed
by President George W. Bush.
Part III of this Article discusses the Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement,
signed by President Obama and ratified by Congress. This agreement includes a
plan to better protect labor unionists against violence. However, many have remaining concerns over the continued human rights violations within Colombia
especially with the paramilitary. American corporations within Colombia have
even been found funding the paramilitary to prevent labor strikes and to provide
protection.
Part IV of this Article analyzes the Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement.
According to the U.S. government, the free trade agreement levels the playing
field for American goods by removing tariffs. However, the agreement fails to
adequately protect workers against human rights violations within Colombia.
Further, the Alien Tort Statute does not provide legal remedy for victims of U.S.
corporation actions.
6 Cortney O'Toole Morgan Er Ai, International Trade, 47 IN'i LAW 81, 83 (2013).
7 M. Angeles Villarreal, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL34470, THE U.S.-COLOMnIA FREE TRAI)E
AGREEMENT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUEs 1 (2014).

8 O'Toole Morgan ET At. supra note 6, at 83.
9 Lisa Haugaard & Vanessa Kritzer, The U.S.-Colombia FTA: Still a Bad Dealfor Human Rights,
HuFUPosr, (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lisa-haugaard/the-uscolombia-fta-baddeal b_983780.html.
10 See, e.g., U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://

www.ustr.gov/uscolombiatpalfacts (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (providing an overview of the U.S.-Colombia trade agreement, including key economic facts about each country).
1 Alewelt, supra note 4, at 167.
12 Id. at 172.
3 Id.
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Part V of this Article considers changes that must be implemented to address
and remedy human rights violations. Labor strikes still occur within Colombia
even after the passage of the Labor Action Plan and the Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement. Consequently, violence against Colombian labor unionists remains high.
II.

History of Colombia Labor Issues

A.

Violence in Colombia

Colombia has the worst human rights and humanitarian crisis in the Latin and
South American region.' 4 It is considered the "most dangerous country in the
world" for members of trade and labor unions, and no country is more dangerous
than Colombia for those fighting for labor rights.' 5 In fact, assassinations of trade
activists in Colombia alone account for eighty-five percent of all trade unionist
assassinations in the world.' 6 Additionally, any labor activists that actively engage in any labor union activities become targets of violence.' 7 The increase in
assassinations of labor union members is attributed to increased activity of
paramilitary groups.' 8
Paramilitary groups have a long history in Colombia. During the 1960s, the
revolutionary group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaria de Colombia ("FARC"),
gained power.1 9 The FARC is one of the world's wealthiest guerilla armies and is
the largest left-wing Colombian revolutionary group. 20 Guerilla and revolutionary groups like the FARC extort payment from rural farmers for protection of the
farmers' land. 2 1 In February 2012, the FARC proclaimed it would no longer
commit kidnapping for ransom. 22 The Ej6rcito de Liberaci6n Nacional ("ELN")
is the second largest guerilla group within Colombia. 23 The ELN formed during
the same time as the FARC 2 4 but has stronger political motivations than the
14 Id. at 167.
15 Id. at 163, 167.
16 Id. at 164. Murder and Impunity: Colombia and Guatemala, US LEAP, http://www.usleap.org/us
leap-campaigns/colombiamurderandimpunity (explaining that Guatemala is the second most dangerous
country for trade unionists. In 2010 fifty-one trade unionists were murdered in Colombia compared to ten
trade unionists assassinated within Guatemala).
17 Alewelt, supra note 4, at 163.
18 Id. at 165-66.
19 Brian A. Ford, From Mountains to Molehills: A Comparative Analysis of Drug Policy, 19 ANN.
SuRV. INT'L & Comr. L. 197, 211 (2013).
20 See, e.g., Profiles: Colombia's armed groups, BBC News (2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-latin-america-I 1400950 (providing an overview of Colombia's paramilitary history).
21 J. Corey Harris, Oppression Through Violence: The Case of Colombia - An Expansion of the
Fetish Object?, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 98, 106 (2006).
22 Profiles: Colombia's armed groups, supra note 20.
23 Virginia M. Bouvier, Colombias' Crossroads: The FARC and the Future ofthe Hostages, UNITED
STATES INSTIfUTE OF PEAcE 3 (2008), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/usipl0002182/f_000
21821282.pdf.
24 Stephanie Hansen, FARC, ELN: Colombia's Left-Wing Guerillas, CouNCIL ON FOREIGN RELArIONs (2009), http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-en-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272.
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FARC. 2 5 ELN originally drew members to "advance their cause of [national]
'liberation or death"' wishing to establish a Colombia with full equality and democracy. 26 Both the FARC and ELN claim to protect the poor farmers of Colombia against the wealthy and U.S.27 A third paramilitary group, the Autodefensas

Unidas de Colombia ("AUC"), consisted mainly of former military and insurgent
persons. 28 Although AUC has reportedly disbanded, attacks by former members
have been reported as late as 2009.29 Altogether, these paramilitary groups selectively kill between 800-900 people throughout Colombia each year. 30
While paramilitary groups are not part of the Colombian government, there is
evidence of close ties between the two.3 1 The Colombian government states that
it made efforts to shield labor activists and union members, but these efforts have
not been successful. 3 2 Seventy to eighty percent of all human rights violations
within Colombia are attributed to these paramilitary groups. 3 3 Human rights violations include massacres, assassinations, tortures, forced displacements, disappearances, kidnappings and drug trafficking. 34
Likewise, paramilitary organizations were legal militias under Law 48, which
was passed in 1968.35 Law 48 gave the Colombian army permission to "organize
and provide arms to groups of civilians called 'self-defense' units."3

6

These self-

defense units were given the power to fight back against guerilla groups such as
the FARC. 3 7 While the FARC kept control over many of the southern and eastern
regions of Colombia, the paramilitary groups in northern Colombia used aggres25 Colombia: Prospects For Peace With The ELN, ii, INTERNATIONAL CRISIs GROUP (2002), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/icg291/icg291.pdf.
26 Id. at 5-6.
27 The guerilla groups in Colombia, UNITED NATIONALS REGIONAL INFORMATION CENTRE FOR WEsT-

ERN EuiRoP, http://www.unric.org/en/colombia/27013-the-guerrilla-groups-in-colombia
Nov. 7, 2014).

(last visited

28 Id.
29 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, MAPPING MILITANT ORGANIZATIONs (2014), availableat

http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/85;
United Self-Defense Forces/
Group of Colombia (AUC-Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/para/auc.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (While the AUC has technically been disbanded, the
extent of their infiltration into Colombia's security forces and government departments has remained
high.).
30 Alewelt, supra note 4, at 168.
31 David Spencer, Colombia's Paramilitaries:Criminals or Political Force? 3 (2001), available at
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUBl9.pdf; see, e.g., Francisco Gutidrrez Sanfn, Telling
the Difference: Guerillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War, 36 Politics & Society 3 (2008) (discussing the difference between Colombian guerilla forces and paramilitary organizations).
32 Alewelt, supra note 4, at 167.
33 Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, TransitionalJustice in Times of Conflict: Colombia's Ley
de Justiciay Paz, 28 MICH. J. INTL'i L. 49, 56 (2006).
34 Id.
35 See,

e.g.,

Garry

Leech,

Fifty

Years

of Violence,

COLOMBIA

JOURNAL

(1999),

http://

colombiajoumal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence (examining the human rights violations repeatedly committed
by paramilitary organizations in Colombia and the history of the government's role in allowing the violence to continue).
36 Id.
37 Id.
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sion and terror tactics to introduce "aggressive counter-agrarian reform." 38 Under
counter-agrarian reform, paramilitary groups forcefully took valuable lands to
favor the interests of "drug traffickers, local landowners and multinationals and
private companies." 39
Under Decree 1194 of 1989, Colombian President Virgilio Barco Vargas imposed criminal penalties on those who formed or operated paramilitary groups
without permission from the President of Colombia. 40 In essence, Decree 1194
abolished paramilitary groups. However, in 1994, under Decree 356, self-defense
units became legal once again. 4 1 These self-defense groups became known as the
"Convivir." 4 2 Decree 356 allowed the Convivir to carry side arms but nothing
else. 4 3 The Convivir "[provides] intelligence for the [Colombian] military." 44
They are essentially government funded paramilitary groups that on occasion act
together with the traditionally violent factions. 45 The government promotes the
Convivir as "democratic security" and, in contrast, the paramilitary groups argue
that the Convivir are the same as them, stating "[let] us not deceive ourselves" all
the Convivir were ours." 4 6
The Colombian military and paramilitary groups continue to have strong
ties. 4 7 In northern Colombia, paramilitary groups and military commanders form
connections to "protect" the agricultural interests of the wealthy from guerilla
extortion. 4 8 Additionally, many officers and soldiers join the paramilitary groups
upon retirement. 49 The Colombian government has been notoriously ineffective
in protecting the rural population, and, as a result, the paramilitary has become a
source of protection for the rural population in spite of the human rights violations the paramilitary groups commit.5 0
The AUC was disbanded between 2003 and 2006, but former paramilitary
members joined forces with drug trafficking groups. 5 ' These groups formed pri38 Id.

39 Ross Eventon, The War on Colombia's Poor, TRADE & INVESIMENT (2012), http://www.tni.org/
article/war-colombias-poor.
40 WI.LuAM AviU-s, GLOBAL CAPITAIUSM, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL-MILrIARY RELATIONS IN COLOM-

BIA 112 (2006).
41 WILLIAM L. MARCY PHD, THE Poirrics oF COCAINE: How U.S. FOREIGN Poiicy HAS CREATED A
THRIVING DRUG INDUSTRY IN CENT[RAL AND SoUTH AMERICA, 216 (2010).

42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.

45 Bulletin No 27: Series on the rights of the victims and the application of Law 975, COMiSiON
COL-OM1IANA DE JURISTAS I (2008), available at http://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/boletines/bol

n27_975_en.pdf.
46 Id. at 4.

47 Laplante, supra note 33.
48 Jose E. Arvelo, International Law and Conflict Resolution in Colombia: Balancing Peace and
Justice in the ParamilitaryDemobilization Process, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 411, 420 (2006).
49 Spencer, supra note 31, at 6.
50 Id. at 18.
51 Colombia's New Armed Groups, INTERNATIONAL CRISis GROUP 1 (2007), available at http://

www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/20_colombia_s-newarmed groups.pdf.
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marily because of the failure of the Colombian government to dismantle the
criminal networks the groups established before the AUC disbanded. 52 These
successor groups are violent and commit various crimes -including massacres,
killings, rapes and extortions. 5 3 The successor groups target human rights defenders, members of trade unions, and those in the successor group "territory" that do
not follow their rules. 54 The Colombian government has been consistently ineffective in dealing with the successor groups. 5 5
B.

2008 U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement

Negotiations between the U.S. and Colombia over a free trade agreement first
began in 2004 under President George W. Bush. 56 The process to attempt to
ratify the free trade agreement was lengthy and complicated. 57 Not only was
there discrepancy between the English and Spanish versions of the agreement,
but there was also considerable opposition to the agreement within the U.S. Congress. 5 8 The Colombian government and President George W. Bush signed the
free trade agreement in November 2006.59 When President George W. Bush submitted the agreement for ratification to Congress in April 2008, the House
Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, changed the House rules, effectively avoiding a vote
within ninety days after a submission by the President. 60 Voting on the agreement was postponed multiple times. 6 1
The agreement was never passed in Congress, in large part due to Democrats
claiming the agreement was damaging to the U.S. economy and to national security. 6 2 However, the refusal to ratify the agreement was based on a few different
issues, including the concern over the safety of workers in Colombia. 63 The 2008
agreement specifically prohibited the intervention of each nation in the enforcement of labor laws in the other. 64 The agreement ensured that if a violation occurred, any person with a legal interest in the matter would have access to
(discussing the various different paramilitary groups and the Colombian government's ineffectiveness in
eliminating them).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.

56 Alewelt, supra note 4, at 161.
57 SANoussi BILAI., PHILIPE

DE LOMBAERDE & DIANA

Tussin, ASYMMETRIC

TRADE NEGCYTIATIONS

49 (Ashgate, 2011).
58 Id.
59 WOLA's Human Rights Arguments Against the Colombia FTA, WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LAlIN

AMERICA (2008),
colombia-fta.

http://www.wola.org/publications/wolas-human-rights-arguments-against-the_

60 BILAL, supra note 57, at 150.
61

Id.

62 Alewelt, supra note 4, at 160-161.

63 Id. at 161.
64 Id. at 178.
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tribunals, the structure of which was left to the discretion of each country. 6 5 For
this reason, Democrats in Congress were hesitant to support the free trade agreement with Colombia. 66 There would have been plenty of potential for abuse of
labor rights due to the close relationship between Colombian officials and the
various paramilitary groups. 67
According to the Washington Office on Latin America ("WOLA"), there are
many human rights related reasons to prevent passing a free trade agreement with
Colombia. 6 8 WOLA argued that a free trade agreement should not be passed
because the rate of killings by the paramilitary remains very high. 69 Additionally,
in 2008 Colombia had approximately 3.8 million displaced people - the second
largest displaced population in the world. 70 It was feared that the trade agreement
might increase the number of displaced individuals, as land used to grow crops
would become more valuable. 7
III.
A.

U.S. Involvement Within Colombia
Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement

In 2011, Congress passed and President Obama signed the CTPA, which entered into force on May 15, 2012.72 A number of factors rendered the CTPA
necessary, primarily increased pressure from other countries negotiating free
trade agreements with Colombia. Colombia has the third largest economy in
Latin and South America, making free trade with the country very important.7 3
U.S. exporters were particularly concerned that they would lose their share in the
Colombian market due to 2011 agreements between Colombia and Canada as
well as 2013 free trade agreements between Colombia and the EU. 7 4 Colombia
has also entered into a regional free trade agreement with Chile, Mexico and
Peru.7 5 Between 2000 and 2011, the share of Colombia's U.S. imports decreased
from thirty-four percent to twenty-seven percent.76 Argentina even replaced the
U.S. in Colombia as the leading supplier of agricultural imports due to a trade
agreement between Argentina and Colombia.7 7 A free trade agreement with Co65 Id.
66 Id. at 182.
67 Id. at 185.

68 WOLA's Human Rights Arguments Against the Colombia FTA, supra note 59.
69 Id.
70 Id.
7' Id.

72 Villarreal, supra note 7; United States, Colombia Set Date for Entry into Force of U.S.-Colombia
Trade Agreement, OFFIcE OF TH

UNIrED STAITS TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Apr. 2012), http://www.ustr

.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2012/april/united-states-colombia-set-date-entry-force-uscolom.
73 Alewelt, supra note 4, at 167.
74 Villarreal, supra note 7, at 26.
75 Id. at 26
76 Id.
77 Id.
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lombia was necessary for the U.S. to globally compete to export U.S. products to
Colombia.
Many members of Congress were opposed to a free trade agreement with Colombia due to the country's labor and human rights violations.7 8 Others believed
that without a free trade agreement, the situation in Colombia for labor activists
would only become more problematic. 79 The Colombian government argues that
while killings still occurred in the country, the problem was decreasing in severity.80 However, the data available on the number of labor union members killed
per year in Colombia vary greatly depending on the source."' Although the rate
of violence in the country still remains high, the homicide rate in Colombia has
decreased over the past decade. 82
President Obama negotiated an Action Plan Related to Labor Rights ("Action
Plan") as a response to concerns of violence against labor union members and
human rights defenders.83 The Action Plan addressed U.S. concerns over "alleged violence against Colombian labor union members, inadequate efforts to
bring perpetrators of violence to justice, and insufficient protection of workers'
rights in Colombia." 84 President Obama stated that the Action Plan was a necessary precondition for a free trade agreement to enter into force.85 The Action Plan
sets forth a number of target dates by which certain obligations are to be met. 8 6
Under the Action Plan, Colombia has an obligation to create a Labor Ministry,
which it established in November 2011.117 The criminal code was reformed to
create penalties for employers that "undermine the right to organize and bargain
collectively." 8 8 The effective date of Article 63 of the 2010 Law of Formalization
and First Employment was accelerated from July 1, 2013 to June 15, 2011.89
Under Article 63, misuse of cooperatives and labor relationships that affect labor
rights are prohibited by law and fines can be inflicted on violators. 90 The Colombian Ministry of Interior and Justice broadened the definition of who was covered
under its protection program to include labor activists, those engaged in efforts to
form unions and former unionists who were threatened for their past activities
78 Id. at 17.

79

Villarreal, supra note 7, at 18.

80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.

83 Id. at 17.
84 Villarreal, supra note 7, at 18.
85 Id.
86 Id.

87 Id. at 19.
88 Id.

89 Villarreal, supra note 7, at 20.
90 id.
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within a union.91 The Action Plan also created obligations for the Colombian
government to create a temporary service agency and criminal justice reform. 92
The CTPA incorporates human rights provisions into the agreement itself. The
CTPA includes strong provisions to protect basic labor rights and labor standards
in addition to "leveling the playing field" for U.S. workers. 93 The United States
and Colombia, under the CTPA, must adopt and maintain the International Labor
Organization's five fundamental workers' rights. 94 The five basic rights are the
freedom of association, the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced compulsory labor, the abolition of child labor
and prohibition on the worst forms of child labor, and the elimination of discrimination of employment and occupation.95 The two countries also have to establish
a mechanism for the public to raise concerns about labor violations directly to
each country's government and to provide workers with access to tribunals
whose proceedings are fair and transparent.96 The CTPA additionally ensures
that Colombia will process protection requests from union members and labor
activists in a more expedient manner.97
B.

CTPA Human Rights Issues

More trade union members were killed in Colombia last year alone than in the
rest of the world combined.9 8 While President Obama and Colombian President
Juan Manuel Santos99 agreed to the Labor Action Plan to protect trade union
members, the plan rewards promises over results.'" There are twenty-two million workers in Colombia, but fourteen million of those workers still lack basic
0
labor rights, such as the right to organize.o'
On top of this, companies allow
workers to form "unions" with just three members, which allows the company to
deny worker rights such as social security, health and pension payments. 0 2
91 Id. at 20-21.
92 Id. at 19-24.
93 Leveling the Playing Field: Labor Protections and the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement 1, 3, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/09302011_1abor-protections
_andthecolombiatradeagreement.pdf.
94 Id. at 3.
95 Villarreal, supra note 7, at 8.
96 Leveling the Playing Field: Labor Protections and the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 93, at 3-4.
97 See generally, Leveling the Playing Field: Labor Protections and the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 93.
98 Haugaard, supra note 9.
99 John Otis, Colombia's New President: A Win for the U.S., TIME (Jun. 21, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1998279,00.html (explaining that President Juan Manuel Santos
was elected in 2010).
100 Id.

101 Daniel Freeman, US-Colombia Labor Action Plan represents 'failure' with 'worsened' conditions:
Report, COILOM13IA REPors (Oct. 29, 2013), http://colombiareports.co/us-colombia-labor-action-planrepresents-failure-worsened-conditions-report/.
102 Id.
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These "unions" are called "contractossindicales" where a union is not representing its members but instead contracting to provide labor to the company.1 03 The
contractossindicales, rather than the companies themselves, are then responsible
under Colombian law for paying its members social security, health and pension
benefits.104 Colombian union representatives argue that a free trade agreement
will interfere with the government's ability to govern the country. 05 The Colombian government further argues that other countries do not keep records of union
member assassinations, therefore, it is hard to classify Colombia as the "most
dangerous country for union members" when data is not available for other countries.10 6 The Colombian government also states that in professions where union
membership is universal, such as educators and judicial branch members, anyone
who is killed within the profession will be a union member, and thus, union
members are not being specifically targeted. 07
Colombian union members argue that a free trade agreement will have a negative effect on Colombia's economy specifically within the agricultural sector. 08
The Central Union of Workers within Colombia claims that the free trade agreement does not "go far enough to protect worker rights." 0 9 In fact, displacement
of union members increased by seventy-six percent in 2012 from 2011, when the
CTPA was implemented.1 10 Colombian union members contend that the free
trade agreement only made the violent situation within Colombia worse and accordingly President Obama must take some sort of action to stop the violence."'
The CTPA will devastate the poor farmers, or campesinos.1 12 The Colombian
campesinos are financially dependent on the crops that they grow; with the free
trade agreement, their crops would compete with U.S. grown products causing
the campesinos to lose anywhere from forty-eight percent to seventy percent of
their total income.' 13 It was estimated that the CTPA would take away at least
250,000 jobs, mostly related to agriculture, within Colombia.1 4 The free trade
The U.S.- Colombia Labor Action Plan: Failing on the Ground, A STAFF REPORT ON BEHALF OF
REPRESENTATIVEs GEORGE MILLER AND JIM McGOvIRN 10 THE CONGRESSIONAL MONITORING
GROuP ON LABoR RIGHTS IN COLOMBIA 1, 10 (Oct. 2010), available at http://democrats.edworkforce
103

U.S.

.house.gov/sites/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/files/documents/Colombia%20trip%20report%20%2010.29.13%20-%20formatted%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
104 Id. at 10.
105

Villarreal, supra note 7, at 28.

106

Id. at 31.
Id.

107

108 Id. at 28.
109 Id.
110 On One-Year Anniversary of U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Colombia Remains Deadliest Country
for Union Members, COMMoN DREAMs (May 15, 2013, 4:18PM), https://www.commondreams.org/news
wire/201 3/05/15-6.
II Id.
112 Haugaard, supra note 9.

113 Id.

I14 Heidi Andrea Restrepo Rhodes, The US-Colombia FTA and National Insecurity: A Call for Ethical
Foreign Policy, Ut'siDEF DOWN (Apr. 28, 2009), http://upsidedownworld.org/main/colombia-archives-61/
1835-the-us-colombia-fta-and-national-insecurity-a-call-for-ethical-foreign-policy.
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agreement provides that tariffs on agricultural products will be phased out over a
three to nineteen year period." 5 Quota tariffs will be eliminated in Colombia in
twelve years for corn and feed grains, fifteen years for dairy products, eighteen
years for chicken legs, and nineteen years for rice.'6 In August 2013, over two
hundred thousand agricultural workers went on strike claiming that the CTPA
have made small farmers within Colombia more exposed to market fluctuations. 17 Allegedly, the Colombian police fired tear gas at the strikers while the
Colombian army patrolled the streets." 8 On the same day, two hundred strikers
outside of a Drummond Company coal mine also went on strike.' 19 The coal
mine strikers were fighting for an increase in wages while the agricultural strikers
20
calling for an increase in government subsidies.1
C.

U.S. Corporation Involvement

The successor groups to the AUC regularly violate human rights by committing massacres, killings, forced displacements, rape and extortion.121 The Colombian government has continuously failed to disband these successor groups.1 22
Part of this failure is caused by U.S. corporate connections to the AUC and their
successor groups. U.S. corporations involved with the paramilitary include
Chiquita Brands International, Coca-Cola, and the Drummond Company. Under
the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), a U.S. federal law, federal courts have the jurisdiction to hear suits filed by non-U.S. citizens for violations of international
law.1 23 International law includes the protection of human rights.1 24 The ATS is
an eighteenth century law that has expanded from crimes such as piracy and war
crimes to include human rights violations.1 25 A suit can be brought under the
ATS against corporations for human rights violations committed abroad as long
as the corporation has sufficient contacts with the United States, acted with a
government entity and had sufficient control over the violations.1 26 The Torture
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Victim Protection Act makes individuals liable "only if they have committed
torture or extrajudicial killings under actual of apparent authority, or color of law,
of any foreign nation." 27 Suits were filed against U.S. corporations such as
Chiquita Brands International, the Drummond Company, Inc., and the Coca-Cola
Company for contracting with Colombian paramilitary groups.
I.

In re Chiquita Brands InternationalInc.

In the 2011 case, In re Chiquita Brands International Inc. Alien Tort Statute
and Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the plaintiffs were the family members of
the trade unionists, workers at the banana plantation, and others that were tortured and killed by the AUC.1 28 The plaintiffs alleged that the decedents were
killed in the 1990s to early 2000s in the banana growing plantation regions
within Colombia.1 2 9 The plaintiffs alleged that Chiquita Brands International
("Chiquita") violated the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection
Act.1 3 0 On March 19, 2007, Chiquita pled guilty for violating federal anti-terrorism laws for their relationship with a Foreign Terrorist Organization.131 Chiquita
was sentenced to a twenty-five million dollar criminal fine and five years probation and was required to implement compliance and ethics programs.1 3 2 It was
after Chiquita's guilty plea that the plaintiffs began filing their civil suits against

Chiquita. 33
The AUC's mission was to remove all guerilla sympathizers who opposed
AUC paramilitary control of the AUC territories.1 3 4 Under Decree 356, private
groups were allowed to provide "Special Vigilance and Private Security Services."' 3 5 These groups were called convivir and they worked closely with the
Colombian military and the AUC.' 36 The AUC was deemed a Foreign Terrorist
Organization by the U.S. government on September 10, 2001.'3 The plaintiffs
alleged that the AUC received support from Chiquita and in exchange for that
support the AUC would remove the FARC and ELN guerillas from the banana
growing region and provide security and "labor quiescence." 3 8
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Chiquita was an American corporation that operated in the Colombian bananagrowing region under its subsidiary, Banadex.' 39 In 1995, Chiquita and the AUC
first formed an agreement wherein Chiquita paid the AUC to suppress union
activity and drive the guerilla groups out of the territory.1 40 Chiquita either paid
the AUC directly or paid the AUC's convivir groups and claimed the payments
were for security services. 14 1 Chiquita also paid the AUC indirectly by having
Banadex employees withdraw money and pay the AUC in cash.1 42 Chiquita top
executives were aware that the AUC was an illegal paramilitary group.14 3 In
2003, Chiquita consulted with a U.S. firm who stated that the payments to the
AUC were in violation of U.S. Law.' 4 On April 24, 2003, Chiquita disclosed the
payments to the U.S Department of Justice who informed Chiquita that these
payments were illegal. 45 Regardless, Chiquita continued to make payments to
the AUC until February of 2004.146 The plaintiffs also allege that Chiquita facilitated arms shipments to the AUC.1 4 7
Initially, the ATS only recognized violations of international law when there
were "violation[s] of safe conduct[s], infringement of rights of ambassadors, and
piracy." 4 8 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court expanded the scope
of the Alien Tort Statute to allow claims where, "the conduct violates an international law norm that is sufficiently well-defined and universally accepted." 1 49
The Court in In re Chiquita Brands International, needed to determine whether

terrorism fell under the scope of the ATS. The court considered the fact that two
other district courts previously determined that terrorism was not a recognized
violation of the law of nations due to differences in the international community
5 0 While the
regarding the definition of terrorism.o
International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism does codify a definition of terrorism, the convention has not been universally accepted because an "overwhelming
majority of states" have not ratified the convention.' 5 ' Therefore, the District
Court held that the plaintiff's claims of terrorism against Chiquita could not be
tried under the ATS.1 52
139 In re Chiquita, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1309; lulia Filip, Chiquita Can't Shuck Colombia Terror
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The District Court in In re Chiquita Brands International ultimately left the
plaintiffs without much recourse for the actions of Chiquita. In later cases, such
as Mohamed v. PalestinianAuthority, the court held that the Torture Victim Protection Act did not apply to corporations. 15 3 Additionally, the District Court in In
re Chiquita Brands International, failed to acknowledge that a large majority of
courts have recognized that terrorism is a violation of the law of nations.1 5 4
2.

Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., Inc.

The plaintiffs in this suit were the family members of the decedents Valmore
Locarno Rodriquez ("Rodriquez"), Victor Hugo Orasita Amaya ("Amaya"), and
Gustavo Soler Mora ("Soler") in addition to the trade union Sintramienergetica
("union").15 5 The plaintiffs alleged wrongful death and aiding and abetting
against Drummond Co., Inc. under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim
Protection Act. 1 5 6
According to a Colombian journalist, the paramilitary had secret workers
within the Drummond coal mines and regularly hired paramilitary members for
"private security" positions.' 5 7 Additionally, the journalist claimed that the
paramilitary would ship cocaine back to the United States on Drummond shipping boats that were transporting coal. 58
The plaintiffs in Rodriquez argued that under international law the right to
associate and organize are established and therefore should be actionable under
the ATS.1 59 Drummond Co. ("Drummond") is a company based in Alabama with
coal operations in Colombia.1 60 The plaintiffs alleged that the AUC acting for
Drummond killed Rodriquez, Amaya and Soler.' 6 ' All three of the decedents
were members of the union.1 6 2 The District Court held that the rights to associate
and organize are actionable as customary and well-established international
153 Ryan A. Keefe, Case Comment, TransnationalLaw- Terrorism and MaterialSupport of Terrorism
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coal" coming from Drummond's Colombian mines there have been an estimated 2,600 homicides all
committed by members of the paramilitary and death squads whose growth was financed in part by
Drummond).
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law.1 63 However, in July 2013 the case was dismissed by the District Court in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.'16
3.

Sinaltrainalv. The Coca-Cola Company

The case, Sinaltrainalv. The Coca-Cola Co., combined four different suits
filed against the Coca-Cola Co. ("Coca-Cola"). The Gil case, the Galvis case, the
Leal case, and the Garcia case were all filed against Coca-Cola and brought
under the ATS, the Torture Victims Protection Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1350; all four
cases alleged that Coca-Cola worked together with the paramilitary to murder
and torture the plaintiffs.1 65 In the Garcia case, the plaintiffs alleged that CocaCola was "vicariously liable for tortious conduct allegedly committed by the local police."' 6 6 In the Gil case, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants hired and
conspired with the paramilitary who murdered and tortured members of the trade
union that represented workers at the bottling factory. 167 In the Galvis case, the
plaintiffs alleged that the facility where the decedent worked collaborated with
the paramilitary to erase union presence within the facility. 168 Similarly, in the
Leal case, the plaintiffs alleged that the facility collaborated with the paramilitary
to rid the facility of union presence in addition to kidnapping and torturing Leal
for his connection to the union.169
The court in Rodriquez v. Romero considered that the ATS had been previously expanded to include corporate defendants and that private individuals could
70 The plaintiffs in Sinaltrainal
be held liable for violations of the law of nations.o
contended that the dangerous situation in Colombia for members of trade unions
was growing more violent and that there is no appropriate legal system for the
people of Colombia. 17' The fact that the Colombian government allowed the private security forces to exist does not make the private actors state actors.1 72
Under the ATS, war crimes exist only when the country is involved in a civil
war.' 7 3 A claim under the Torture Victim Protection Act must allege that the
paramilitaries are state actors or have sufficient contacts with the government to
be acting under the color of the law, and the defendants conspired with the state
actors to carry out the alleged torture.1 74 In this case, the plaintiffs failed to meet
163 NEILS BEISINGHOFF, CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS O ATCA LITIGATION
AGAINST CORPORAIONs 255-256 (2009).
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the requirements to bring a claim under the ATS and the Torture Victim Protection Act because they failed to sufficiently allege that the abuses were committed
during war or that the paramilitary groups were acting under the color of the

law. 175
IV.

Impact of the Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement

While the CTPA removes trade barriers between the U.S. and Colombia and
does "even the playing field" for the U.S. with regards to tariff protections, it
does not weigh the human rights issues evenly.' 7 6 Not only do labor unions,
farmers and campesinos in Colombia oppose the CTPA, members of the U.S.
Congress, as well as many human rights organizations are also against it. The
primary human rights issue with the CTPA is the lack of protection for members
of labor unions and the lack of any adequate action union members may take
against the government, paramilitary and U.S. corporations.
The U.S. and Colombia have long been close allies, and it is argued that Colombia is the United States' closest ally in the South American region.177 Supporters of the CTPA contend that the trade agreement provides many
opportunities for the Colombian people.' 7 8 These benefits include creating alternative ways for Colombians to make money that do not involve drug trafficking,
and having a stronger rule of law and system for workers' rights. 179 The CTPA
requirements include a commitment on behalf of both parties to adhere to the
International Labour Organization's five fundamental workers' rights and requires that workers have access to tribunals when their rights are infringed
upon.' 8 0 Further, the CTPA is important and necessary, as Colombia has ratified
free trade agreements with other countries.
Those opposed to the CTPA argue that the U.S. is more concerned with trade
protection than the many human rights violations that occur within Colombia.
Under the Andean Trade Preference Act ("ATPA"), over ninety percent of imports from Colombia into the U.S. enter the United States duty free.1 8 ' However,
175 Id.

See generally U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement, supra note 10.
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visited Jan. 18, 2015), www.latradecoalition.org/files/2010/09/04-Fast-Facts-on-Colombial.pdf.
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supra note 178. Andean Trade Preference Act, Office of the United States Trade Representatives http://
www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/andean-trade-preference-act-atpa
(ATPA was enacted in December 1991 to assist Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru to fight drug
production and trafficking within their countries); Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) - Expiration of
duty-free treatment, U.S. Customs and Borer Protectiont https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detailla_id/
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February 12, 2011 and offered duty free protection until July 31, 2013.).
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U.S. exports to Colombia are subject to tariffs - fourteen percent for manufactured goods and over fifty percent for agricultural exports.1 8 2 The CTPA also
protects U.S. intellectual property rights in the manner that they are protected
within the U.S. itself, especially with regards to copyrighted works, trademark
counterfeiting, and copyright piracy. 83
Within Colombia, some argue that the supposed decrease in violence since the
CTPA entered into force is greatly skewed. 1 8 4 According to the NGO Consultario
para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento ("CODHES"), the number of
displaced Colombians continues to grow due, in part, to the campesinos' use of
valuable farmland.' 85 Approximately two hundred fifty-nine thousand Colombians were displaced in 2011 alone.1 8 6 Prior to the CTPA, the Colombian Ministry
of Agriculture said that the trade agreement would further harm the rural Colombians and leave them with only three options: "migration to the cities or other
countries. . .working in drug cultivation zones, or affiliating with illegal armed
groups."' 87 CODHES states that displacement in 2012 increased by eighty-three
percent.' 8 8 The fact that the violence has not changed within Colombia shows
that the U.S. and President Obama are not as invested in the horrific human rights
situation within Colombia. The Labor Action Plan clearly has not bettered life for
labor unionists or rural Colombians.
It is against U.S. law for corporations to interact with paramilitary groups such
as the AUC and FARC.' 89 However, U.S. corporations such as Chiquita Brands
International, Coca-Cola, Dole Food Company and Drummond Cole Company
have all either been accused or have admitted to associating with paramilitary
organizations. 190 Chiquita Brands International admitted to paying the AUC and
was fined twenty-five million dollars in a plea agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice; however, it was later discovered that Chiquita was also shipping
guns and ammunition for the paramilitary's use.191 U.S. corporations associate
with the paramilitary to keep their costs of production at a minimum and avoid
negotiating with labor unions. 19 2 Furthermore, the paramilitary often works in
182 Id. at Why Support the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement? Growth, Hope, and
Opportunity.
183 U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement, supra note 10.
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186 Id.; See generally World Report 2014: Colombia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/
world-report/2014/country-chapters/colombia (explaining that contrary to CODHES, Human Rights
Watch states over 150,000 Colombians are displaced every year with currently over 5 million Colombians who have been displaced).
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conjunction with the local Colombian government authorities,1 9 3 further endangering any labor unionists that conflict with U.S. corporations and ensuring that
the U.S. corporations can continue to "protect" their interests. Within the U.S.,
corporations continue to fund paramilitary groups with minimal repercussions.
The lawsuits filed against Coca-Cola and the Dole Food Company were dismissed, which left the victims with no legal recourse. 19 4 Part of the problem is
that international law is not defined and paramilitary actions are not always considered violations of international law.
Further, the applicability of the ATS was greatly reduced under the 2013 U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.195 The Supreme
Court stated "[t]he ATS covers actions by aliens for violations of the law of
nations, but that does not imply extraterritorial reach."' 9 6 Under Kiobel the question became "not whether a federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a cause of
action provided by foreign or even international law. The question is instead
whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action under U.S. law to
enforce a norm of international law."' 9 7 Further, nothing in the text of the ATS
states that the United States is responsible for enforcing customary international
law.' 9 8 The court held that because all the conduct in question took place outside
of the U.S., mere corporate presence was not sufficient to bring a cause under the
ATS.' 99 Further, "even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritorial application." 20 0 Essentially, the Supreme Court found that
the ATS only applies to conduct that occurs on U.S. soil.201 Therefore, it has
become extremely difficult if not impossible for victims of U.S. corporations'
overseas actions to force the corporations to take responsibility for their
actions. 202
193 World Report 2014: Colombia supra note 186 ("Since the 'parapolitics' scandal erupted in 2005,
more than 55 current and former members of Congress have been convicted for conspiring with
paramilitaries.").
194 Id.; Juan Smirh, Colombia: Ex-Paramilitary Implicates Two U.S. Companies in Murder of Trade
Unionists, NORTH AMERICAN CONGRISS ON LATIN AMERICA (2009) https://nacla.org/news/colombia-ex-

paramilitary-implicates-two-us-companies-murder-trade-unionists (describing that a civil suit was also
filed against Dole Food Company by the families of the victims of purported paramilitary acts within
Colombia. Dole denied involvement with Colombian paramilitary groups unlike Chiquita); Frivolous
Lawsuit Filed Against Dole By Colombian Plaintiffs Dismissed With Prejudice, Dous (2009) http://www.
dole.com/Company-Info/Press-Releases/Press-Release-20100916 (explaining that the lawsuit against
Dole was dismissed without prejudice).
195 See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
196 Id. at 1665.
197 Id. at 1666.
198 Id. at 1668.
199 Id. at 1669.
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201 Rich Samp, Supreme Court Observations: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum & the Future ofAlien
Tort Litigation, FoRnEs (2013) (noting that Congress' intention in adopting the ATS was purportedly to
give foreign ambassadors the ability to seek reparation in the U.S. if attacked on U.S. soil).
202 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (noting that the Supreme Court confirmed Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and held that Daimler could not be subjected to suit within California where
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V. Necessary Improvements to Improve the Colombian Trade Promotion
Agreement
President Obama stated that the CTPA will help Colombian workers as the
CTPA includes "strong protections." 203 Unions within the U.S., as well as within
Colombia, are strongly opposed to the free trade agreement between the two
countries. However, the U.S. government favors the CTPA because of the trade
protections it offers the U.S. and the potential to diminish the violence against
trade unionists and rural landowners within Colombia. Before President Obama
considered implementing the CTPA, he proposed that Colombia implement a
Labor Action Plan. Labor unionists in Colombia state that the Labor Action Plan
has not been effective in protecting those belonging to labor unions. 204 In October 2012, Human Rights Watch released a study that found "virtually no progress" was made in the amount of convictions for killings that have occurred in
the last four years. 205
It is clear that the CTPA is not working. In fact, strikes within Colombia still
occur but receive little to no media coverage. In August 2013, Colombian farmers went on strike to protest the effects of the CTPA. 206 The strike included
coffee, cacao, potato and rice farmers, as well as cargo truckers, gold miners, and
teacher and labor unions. 20 7 The strike originally began with the rural peasants
before spreading to the miners, teachers, medical professionals and students. 2 0 8
The strikers are demanding reduced fuel and fertilizer prices, higher subsidies
and the cancellation of all free trade agreements. 2 0 9 The free trade agreements
have made it impossible for Colombian farmers and workers to compete with
international products. The strike has been met brutally by the Colombian police
who have been reported to use shootings, sexual assault, torture, and tear gas
among other abuses to quell the strike. 2 10
It is clear that something must be done for the CTPA to be a mutually beneficial agreement. As it stands currently, the U.S. is benefitting far more than the
Colombian people. Colombia remains the most dangerous country in the world
for trade unionists even with the implementation of the Labor Action Plan and
the CTPA. U.S. corporations are still able to get away with paying the paramilitary to prevent and quell labor strikes leaving no recourse for labor unionists.
neither Daimler nor its Argentinean subsidiary was incorporated in California and all activity occurred
outside of the U.S. within Argentina).
203 Julie Pace, Obama: US, Colombia trade deal a 'win', BIOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 15, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-04/D9U5K7F8 1.htm.
204 Id.
205 Id.

206 See generally Dave Johnson, Strike in Colombia Highlights Free Trade Failure, CAMPAIGN FOR
AMERICA'S FUTURE (Aug. 26, 2013), http://ourfuture.org/20130826/big-columbia-strike-hilites-freetrade-fail.
207 Id.

208 Jeanine Legato, Are Colombian Protests the 'Opening Salvo in a Full-FrontalAttack' on Free
Trade?, COMMON DREAMs (Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/09/05-5.
209 Dave Johnson, supra note 206.
210 Legato, supra note 209.
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Action needs to be taken in order for a free trade agreement that upholds human
rights in Colombia to exist. The U.S. needs to execute stricter punishment for
U.S. corporations that associate with the criminal paramilitary groups. U.S. corporations cannot be allowed to simply pay a fine, and not be forced to change
their behavior.
Furthermore, the Colombian government must be held accountable for upholding the human rights provisions within the CTPA. The Colombian govermment
needs to reduce the number of paramilitary organizations and find a way to end
the government's close relationship with the paramilitary. The Colombian government must also provide an adequate forum for dispute resolution, one that is
widely available and guarantees the safety of the labor unionists. Lastly, within
international law, a definition of terrorism must be agreed upon and widely accepted by the international community. A widely accepted definition of terrorism
may provide the victims of violence in Colombia a legal remedy.
VI.

Conclusion

Colombia remains a dangerous country rife with human rights violations. President Obama used the Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement as a way to reduce trade barriers between Colombia and the U.S. and to make Colombia safer
for trade unionists. However, the Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement has not
made life better or safer for Colombians. Instead, it made competition with U.S.
goods extremely difficult for Colombian farmers and failed to change the violent
situation in Colombia.
Trade unionists continue to be killed for being associated with unions.
Paramilitary groups continue to work with U.S. corporations and the Colombian
government. Unfortunately, even under the ATS and the Torture Victim Protection Act, the family members of the killed Colombian trade unionists have no
legal remedies. The narrow limits of both laws often do not include U.S. corporation paramilitary involvement. While the CTPA does remove trade barriers between the U.S. and Colombia, it does little to alleviate human rights issues. Until
a change is made, the violence against trade unionists within Colombia will
continue.
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